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Abstract— A discrete memoryless generalized multiple access
channel (GMAC) with confidential messages is studied, where two
users attempt to transmit common information to a destination
and each user also has private (confidential) information intended
for the destination. This channel generalizes the multiple access
channel (MAC) in that the two users also receive channel outputs.
It is assumed that each user views the other user as a wire-
tapper, and wishes to keep its confidential information as secret
as possible from the other user. The level of secrecy of the
confidential information is measured by the equivocation rate.
The performance measure of interest is the rate-equivocation
tuple that includes the common rate, two private rates and
two equivocation rates as components. The set that includes all
achievable rate-equivocation tuples is referred to as the capacity-
equivocation region. For the GMAC with one confidential mes-
sage set, where only one user (user 1) has private (confidential)
information for the destination, inner and outer bounds on
the capacity-equivocation region are derived. The outer bound
provides a tight converse to the secrecy capacity region, which
is the set of all achievable rates with user 2 being perfectly
ignorant of confidential messages of user 1, thus establishing
the secrecy capacity region. Furthermore, the degraded GMAC
with one confidential message set is further studied, and the
capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region are
established. For the GMAC with two confidential message sets,
where both users have confidential messages for the destination,
an inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region is obtained.
The secrecy rate region is derived, where each user’s confidential
information is perfectly hidden from the other user.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two important issues in communications are reliability and
security. The reliability quantifies the maximum achievable
rate (capacity) with small probability of error, and has been
studied intensively since Shannon theory was established [1].
Security is an important issue when the transmitted informa-
tion is confidential and needs to be kept as secret as possible
from wire-tappers or eavesdroppers. The level of secrecy of
confidential information at a wire-tapper can be measured by
the equivocation rate, i.e., the entropy rate of confidential
messages conditioned on channel outputs at the wire-tapper. If
both reliability and security are considered, the performance
measure of interest is the rate-equivocation tuple that includes
both the communication rates and the equivocation rates
(achieved at wire-tappers) as components. We refer to the set
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that consists of all achievable rate-equivocation tuples as the
capacity-equivocation region.
Communication of confidential messages has been studied
in the literature for some classes of channels. The wire-tap
channel was introduced by Wyner in [2], where a sender
wishes to transmit information to a legitimate receiver and to
keep a wire-tapper as ignorant of this information as possible.
The channel from the sender to the legitimate receiver and the
wire-tapper was assumed to be a degraded broadcast channel.
The trade-off between the communication rate to the legitimate
receiver and the level of ignorance at the wire-tapper was
developed.
The broadcast channel with confidential messages was stud-
ied in [3] as a generalization of the wire-tap channel, where
the sender also wishes to transmit common information to
both the legitimate receiver and the wire-tapper in addition to
the private (confidential) information to the legitimate receiver.
Moreover, the broadcast channel from the sender to the two
receivers was assumed to be general and may not be degraded.
The capacity-equivocation region was established for this
channel, and the secrecy capacity region was given. The relay
channel with confidential messages was studied in [4], where
the relay node acts as both a helper and a wire-tapper.
In this paper, we consider a two-user generalized multiple
access channel (GMAC) with confidential messages, which
generalizes the multiple access channel (MAC) [5, Sec. 14.3]
by allowing both users to receive noisy channel outputs.
This channel model is motivated by wireless communications,
where transmitted signals are broadcast over open media and
can be received by all nodes within communication range. For
this channel, we assume that users 1 and 2 have common infor-
mation and each user has its private (confidential) information
intended for a destination. Since two users also receive channel
outputs, they may extract each other’s confidential information
from their received channel outputs. However, each user treats
the other user as a wire-tapper, and wishes to keep this wire-
tapper as ignorant of its confidential message as possible. The
level of ignorance of one user’s confidential message at the
other user (wire-tapper) is measured by the equivocation rate.
Our goal is to study the capacity-equivocation region of the
GMAC with confidential messages.
We first study the GMAC with one confidential message set,
where two users have common information for the destination
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and only one user (user 1) has private (confidential) informa-
tion for the destination. For this case, we obtain inner and outer
bounds on the capacity-equivocation region. The two bounds
match partially and determine the capacity-equivocation re-
gion partially. Furthermore, the outer bound provides a tight
converse to the secrecy capacity region, which is the set of
all achievable rates with user 2 being perfectly ignorant of
confidential messages of user 1, and we hence establish the
secrecy capacity region. We also study the degraded GMAC
with one confidential message set, where outputs at user 2
are degraded versions of outputs at the destination. For this
channel, we show a tight converse and establish the capacity-
equivocation region and the secrecy capacity region.
We further study the general case of the GMAC with two
confidential message sets, where both users have confidential
messages for the destination in addition to common messages.
We obtain an achievable rate-equivocation region (inner bound
on the capacity-equivocation region). We demonstrate a trade-
off between the two equivocation rates corresponding to the
two sets of confidential messages sent by user 1 and user 2.
Based on the rate-equivocation region, we derive the secrecy
rate region, where confidential messages of each user are
perfectly secret from the other user.
In this paper, we use xn to indicate the vector (x1, . . . , xn),
and use xni to indicate the vector (xi, . . . , xn).
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we
introduce the channel model of the GMAC with confidential
messages. In Section III, we present our results for the GMAC
with one confidential message set. In Section IV, we present
our results for the degraded GMAC with one confidential
message set. In Section V, we present our results for the
general case of the GMAC with two confidential message sets.
In the final section, we give concluding remarks. We omit the
proofs due to space limitations. The details can be found in
[6].
II. CHANNEL MODEL
In this section, we first define the GMAC, and then define
the performance measure of interest for the GMAC with
confidential messages.
Definition 1: A discrete memoryless GMAC consists of
two finite channel input alphabets X1 and X2, three finite
channel output alphabets Y,Y1 and Y2, and a transition
probability distribution p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2) (see Fig. 1), where
x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2 are channel inputs from users 1 and
2, respectively, and y ∈ Y, y1 ∈ Y1 and y2 ∈ Y2 are channel
outputs at the destination, user 1 and user 2, respectively.
Definition 2: A (2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) code for the GMAC
consists of the following:
• Three message sets: W0 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR0}, W1 =
{1, 2, . . . , 2nR1} and W2 = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR2}. The com-
mon message W0 and private messages W1 and W2 are
independent and uniformly distributed over the message
sets W0,W1 and W2, respectively.
• Two (stochastic) encoders, one at user 1: W0 ×W1 →
Xn1 , which maps each message pair (w0, w1) ∈ W0×W1
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Fig. 1. Generalized multiple access channel
to a codeword xn1 ∈ Xn1 ; the other at user 2: W0×W2 →
Xn2 , which maps each message pair (w0, w2) ∈ W0×W2
to a codeword xn2 ∈ Xn2 ;
• One decoder at the destination: Yn →W0×W1×W2,
which maps a received sequence yn to a message tuple
(w0, w1, w2) ∈ W0 ×W1 ×W2.
Note that in the GMAC although users 1 and 2 can receive
channel outputs (see Fig. 1), they are only passive listeners
in that their encoding functions are not affected by these
received outputs. However, since outputs at each user contain
the other user’s private (confidential) information, each user
may extract the other user’s private (confidential) information
from its outputs. We assume that each user treats the other
user as a wire-tapper, and wishes to keep the other user as
ignorant of its private (confidential) messages as possible. We
hence define the following two equivocation rates:
at user 2: 1
n
H(W1|Y
n
2 , X
n
2 ,W0,W2)
at user 1:
1
n
H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ,W0,W1)
(1)
which indicate the level of ignorance of the confidential
message W1 at user 2 and the level of ignorance of the
confidential message W2 at user 1, respectively. Note that the
larger the equivocation rate, the higher the level of secrecy.
For the GMAC with confidential messages, a rate-
equivocation tuple (R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e) is achievable if
there exists a sequence of
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , 2nR2 , n
)
codes with
the average error probability P (n)e → 0 as n goes to infinity
and with the equivocation rates R1,e and R2,e satisfying
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W1|Y
n
2 , X
n
2 ,W0,W2) ≥ R1,e
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W2|Y
n
1 , X
n
1 ,W0,W1) ≥ R2,e.
(2)
Note that the rate-equivocation tuple (R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e)
includes both the reliable communication rates and the equiv-
ocation rates, and it indicates the common and private rates
(R0, R1, R2) achieved at certain levels of communication
secrecy (R1,e, R2,e) .
The capacity-equivocation region, denoted by C , is the clo-
sure of the set that consists of all achievable rate-equivocation
tuples (R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e). Our goal is to study the
capacity-equivocation region of the GMAC with confidential
messages.
2
III. GMAC WITH ONE CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE SET
In this section, we study the GMAC with one confidential
message set, where user 2 has only common messages and
does not have confidential messages for the destination. This
model generalizes the MAC with degraded message sets
studied in [7] to consider the private messages sent from user
1 to be confidential, i.e., needing to be as secret as possible
from user 2. This model is also a counterpart of the broadcast
channel with confidential messages studied in [3].
For the GMAC with one confidential message set, the rate
R2 = 0, and the equivocation rate R2,e is not of interest.
Hence channel outputs at user 1 do not play roles in the
analysis. For notational convenience, we use Re to indicate
R1,e in this case. Now the rate-equivocation tuple becomes
(R0, R1, Re); i.e., it contains three components. The following
two theorems provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-
equivocation region C I of the GMAC in this situation.
Theorem 1: The following convexified region is an inner
bound on the capacity-equivocation region C I for the GMAC
with one confidential message set:
R
I = Convex
⋃
p(q, x2)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(y, y2|x1, x2)

(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y |X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,X2, Q;Y ),
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ [I(U ;Y |X2, Q)− I(U ;Y2|X2, Q)]+,
Re ≤ [I(U,X2, Q;Y )−R0 − I(U ;Y2|X2, Q)]+


(3)
where the function [x]+ = x if x ≥ 0 and [x]+ = 0 if x <
0. The auxiliary random variables Q and U are bounded in
cardinality by |Q| ≤ |X1| · |X2|+ 3 and |U| ≤ |X1|2 · |X2|2 +
4|X1| · |X2|+ 3, respectively.
Remark 1: The last bound in (3) indicates that there is
a trade-off between the common rate and the secrecy level
of confidential messages. As common rate R0 increases, the
secrecy level of confidential messages may get lower.
Remark 2: The rate-equivocation region (3) reduces to the
capacity region of the MAC with degraded message sets given
in [7] by setting U = X1 and Re = 0.
Theorem 2: The following region is an outer bound on
the capacity-equivocation region C I of the GMAC with one
confidential message set:
R
I
=
⋃
p(q, x2)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(v|q)p(y, y2|x1, x2)

(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y |X2, V ),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,X2, Q;Y ),
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ I(U ;Y |X2, Q)− I(U ;Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +Re ≤ I(U,X2, Q;Y )− I(U ;Y2|X2, Q)


.
(4)
Remark 3: The last four bounds in the outer bound (4)
match the last four bounds in the inner bound (3), and hence
these four common bounds partially determine the boundary
of the capacity-equivocation region C I .
We now study the case where perfect secrecy is achieved,
i.e., user 2 does not get any information about confidential
messages that user 1 sends to the destination. This happens if
Re = R1.
Definition 3: The secrecy capacity region CIs is the region
that includes all achievable rate pairs (R0, R1) such that Re =
R1, i.e.,
CIs = {(R0, R1) : (R0, R1, R1) ∈ C
I}. (5)
Definition 4: For a given rate R0, the secrecy capacity
CIs (R0) is the maximum achievable rate R1 with confidential
messages perfectly hidden from user 2, i.e.,
CIs (R0) = max
(R0,R1)∈CIs
R1. (6)
Although the outer bound (4) given in Theorem 2 provides
only a partial converse to the capacity-equivocation region, it
is sufficiently tight to serve as the converse to the secrecy
capacity region and secrecy capacity (as a function of the
common rate R0).
Theorem 3: For the GMAC with one confidential message
set, the following region is the secrecy capacity region:
CIs =
⋃
p(q, x2)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(y, y2|x1, x2)

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y |X2, Q)− I(U ;Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,X2, Q;Y )− I(U ;Y2|X2, Q)


.
(7)
The secrecy capacity for a given rate R0 is given by
CIs (R0) =maxmin{I(U ;Y |X2, Q)− I(U ;Y2|X2, Q),
I(U,X2, Q;Y )− I(U ;Y2|X2, Q)−R0}
(8)
where the maximum is taken over all joint distributions
p(q, x2)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(y, y2|x1, x2). In both (7) and (8), the
auxiliary random variables Q and U are bounded in cardinality
by |Q| ≤ |X1|·|X2|+3 and |U| ≤ |X1|2 ·|X2|2+4|X1|·|X2|+3,
respectively.
Remark 4: If we let R0 = 0 and X2 := φ, the GMAC
with one confidential message set reduces to the case of a
broadcast channel with confidential messages studied in [3]
with the common rate being zero. For this channel, the secrecy
capacity in (8) reduces to
CIs = max[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Y2)] (9)
where the max is taken over all joint distribution
p(u, x1)p(y, y2|x1). This is the same as the secrecy capacity
given in Corollary 2 in [3].
IV. DEGRADED GMAC WITH ONE CONFIDENTIAL
MESSAGE SET
In this section, we study the degraded GMAC with one con-
fidential message set, which generalizes the wire-tap channel
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studied in [2] to allow user 1 and user 2 (wire-tapper) to jointly
send common information to the destination.
In the following, we define two classes of degraded GMACs
with one confidential message set.
Definition 5: The GMAC with one confidential message set
is physically degraded if the transition probability distribution
satisfies
p(y, y2|x1, x2) = p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2). (10)
Definition 6: The GMAC with one confidential message set
is stochastically degraded if its conditional marginal distribu-
tion is the same as that of a physically degraded GMAC, i.e.,
there exists a distribution p(y2|y, x2) such that
p(y2|x1, x2) =
∑
y
p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2). (11)
We note the following useful lemma.
Lemma 1: The capacity-equivocation region of GMACs
with confidential messages depends only on the marginal
channel transition probability distributions p(y|x1, x2),
p(y1|x1, x2), and p(y2|x1, x2).
Based on Lemma 1, we have the following capacity-
equivocation region for both physically and stochastically
degraded GMACs with confidential messages.
Theorem 4: For the degraded GMAC with one confidential
message set, the capacity-equivocation region is given by
C
I
d =
⋃
p(q, x2)p(x1|q)p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2)

(R0, R1, Re) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q)− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +Re ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q)


,
(12)
where Q is bounded in cardinality by |Q| ≤ |X1| · |X2|+ 1.
Remark 5: The region C Id can be shown to be convex, and
hence does not need further convexification.
The following secrecy capacity region and secrecy capacity
(as a function of R0) follow from Theorem 4.
Corollary 1: For the degraded GMAC with one confidential
message set, the secrecy capacity region is given by
CIs,d =
⋃
p(q, x2)p(x1|q)p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2)

(R0, R1) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2, Q)− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q)


.
(13)
The secrecy capacity as a function of R0 is given by
CIs,d(R0) = maxmin{I(X1;Y |X2, Q)− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q),
I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Y2|X2, Q)−R0}
(14)
where the maximum is taken over all joint distributions
p(q, x2)p(x1|q)p(y|x1, x2)p(y2|y, x2). In both (13) and (14),
Q is bounded in cardinality by |Q| ≤ |X1| · |X2|+ 1.
V. GMAC WITH TWO CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGE SETS
In this section, we consider the general case of the GMAC
with confidential messages, where the two users have com-
mon messages and each user has private (confidential) mes-
sages intended for the destination. For this case, the rate-
equivocation tuple has five components and takes the form
(R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e), where R1,e and R2,e are equivoca-
tion rates indicating the secrecy levels of confidential messages
sent by user 1 and confidential messages sent by user 2,
respectively.
Theorem 5: The following convexified region of nonnega-
tive rate-equivocation tuples is achievable for the GMAC with
two confidential message sets:
R
II = Convex
⋃
p(q)p(u|q)p(x1|u)p(v|q)p(x2|v)
p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2)

(R0, R1, R2, R1,e, R2,e) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y |V,Q),
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U,Q),
R1 + R2 ≤ I(U, V ;Y |Q),
R0 + R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V,Q;Y ),
(R1,e, R2,e) ∈ Se(R0, R1, R2)


,
(15)
where
Se(R0, R1,R2) =
⋃
(R′1, R
′
2) : (R0, R
′
1, R
′
2) ∈ C
p
MAC ,
R1 ≤ R
′
1, R2 ≤ R
′
2

(R0, R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1
R1,e ≤ [R
′
1 − I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)]+
0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ [R
′
2 − I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+


(16)
where CpMAC is defined as
CpMAC =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y |V,Q),
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U,Q),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V ;Y |Q),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V,Q;Y )


. (17)
The region Se(R0, R1, R2) can be characterized by an
explicit form with inequality bounds only.
Theorem 6: The set Se(R0, R1, R2) in (16) can be ex-
pressed in the following explicit form:
Se(R0, R1, R2)
= L1(R0, R1, R2) ∪ L2(R0, R1, R2) ∪ L3(R0, R1, R2)
(18)
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where
L1(R0, R1, R2)
=


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1, 0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R1,e ≤ [I(U ;Y |V,Q)− I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(U, V ;Y |Q)−R2 − I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q;Y )−R0 −R2
−I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)]+
R2,e ≤ [I(V ;Y |U,Q)− I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(U, V ;Y |Q)−R1 − I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q;Y )−R0 −R1
−I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+
R1,e +R2,e ≤ [I(U, V ;Y |Q)− I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)
−I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R1,e +R2,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q;Y )−R0
−I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)− I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+


L2(R0, R1, R2)
=


(R1,e, R2,e) :
0 ≤ R1,e ≤ R1, R2,e = 0
R1,e ≤ [I(U ;Y |V,Q)− I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(U, V ;Y |Q)−R2 − I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)]+,
R1,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q;Y )−R0 −R2
−I(U ;Y2|X2, V,Q)]+


L3(R0, R1, R2)
=


(R1,e, R2,e) :
R1,e = 0, 0 ≤ R2,e ≤ R2
R2,e ≤ [I(V ;Y |U,Q)− I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(U, V ;Y |Q)−R1 − I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+,
R2,e ≤ [I(U, V,Q;Y )−R0 −R1
−I(V ;Y1|X1, U,Q)]+


Remark 6: The region (15) reduces to the capacity region
of the MAC [5] by removing the secrecy constraints (R1,e =
0, R2,e = 0) and setting U = X1 and V = X2.
Remark 7: The last two bounds in L1(R0, R1, R2) indicate
that there is a trade-off between the two equivocation rates
R1,e and R2,e, i.e., the secrecy levels achieved for the two
confidential message sets W1 and W2.
We now study the case where confidential messages of each
user are perfectly hidden from the other user. This happens
when R1,e = R1 and R2,e = R2. The rate region that contains
all these rate tuples is called the secrecy capacity region and
is given by
CIIs = {(R0, R1, R2) : (R0, R1, R2, R1, R2) ∈ C
II}. (19)
The following inner bound on the secrecy capacity region
CIIs follows from Theorem 5 and Theorem 6.
Corollary 2: An inner bound on secrecy capacity region for
the GMAC with two confidential message sets is given by:
RIIs = Convex
⋃
p(q)p(u|q)p(x1|u)
p(v|q)p(x2|v)
p(y, y1, y2|x1, x2)
{
Rs,1 ∪Rs,2 ∪Rs,3
}
where
Rs,1 =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y |V,Q)− I(U ;Y2|V,X2, Q),
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U,Q)− I(V ;Y1|U,X1, Q),
R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V ;Y |Q)− I(U ;Y2|V,X2, Q)
−I(V ;Y1|U,X1, Q),
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U, V,Q;Y )
−I(U ;Y2|V,X2, Q)− I(V ;Y1|U,X1, Q)


Rs,2 =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 ≥ 0, R2 = 0,
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y |V,Q)− I(U ;Y2|V,X2, Q),
R0 + R1 ≤ I(U, V,Q;Y )− I(U ;Y2|V,X2, Q)


Rs,3 =


(R0, R1, R2) :
R0 ≥ 0, R1 = 0, R2 ≥ 0,
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y |U,Q)− I(V ;Y1|U,X1, Q),
R0 +R2 ≤ I(U, V,Q;Y )− I(V ;Y1|U,X1, Q)


VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the capacity-equivocation region of the
GMAC with confidential messages. For the GMAC with one
confidential message set, we have derived inner and outer
bounds on the capacity-equivocation region. Although the
two bounds only match partially, they are tight enough to
characterize the secrecy capacity region, where confidential
messages sent by user 1 are perfectly hidden from user 2. For
the degraded GMAC with one confidential message set, we
have established the capacity-equivocation region. In [6], we
have also studied two example GMACs with one confidential
message set, the binary degraded GMAC and the Gaussian
GMAC.
We have further obtained an achievable rate-equivocation
region (inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region) for
the general case of the GMAC with two confidential message
sets. We have shown that the achievable rate-equivocation
region for the case of two confidential message sets carries
a new feature of a trade-off between the two equivocation
rates corresponding to the two confidential message sets sent
by the two users.
REFERENCES
[1] C. E. Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell Syst.
Tech. J., vol. 27, pp. 379–423 and 623–656, 1948.
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[3] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,”
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May 1978.
[4] Y. Oohama, “Coding for relay channels with confidential messages,” in
Proc. IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), Cairns, Australia, Sept.
2001, pp. 87–89.
[5] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. New
York: Wiley, 1991.
[6] Y. Liang and H. V. Poor, “Generalized multiple access channels with con-
fidential messages,” submitted to IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, April 2006;
available at http://www.arxiv.org/PS cache/cs/pdf/0605/0605014.pdf.
[7] V. V. Prelov, “Transmission over a multiple-access channel with a special
source heirarchy,” Probl. Inform. Transm., vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 3–10, Oct.-
Dec. 1984.
5
